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POLITICAL COMPETITION IN A MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
SOME THEORETICAL RESULTS1 
ABSTRACT 
We study a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions 
about capital accumulation and consumption are made through a political 
process of two candidate competition. Each voter's utility for a consumption 
stream is the discounted value of that voter's utility of consumption in each 
period. We consider the case when voters' one period utility functions for 
consumption are identical but discount factors are different . We are 
particularly interested in the conditions under which neoclassical optimal 
growth paths occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. 
The answer depends on the ability or inability of the candidates to commit to 
multi-period investment strategies. 
If candidates can commit indefinitely into the future, then a political 
(majority rule) equilibrium path will not exist if all discount factors are 
different. For any feasible consumption path, there is a perturbation which is 
majority preferred to it. For any neoclassical optimal path there exists a 
perturbated path that is preferred to it either unanimously or by all but one 
voter. These results are true even if the perturbations can differ at no more 
than three consecutive periods from the original path. 
If candidates are unable to commit to multi-period plans, we show 
there is a unique subgame perfect, stationary, symmetric equilibrium to the 
infinite horizon two candidate competition game; namely the optimal 
consumption path for the median voter. The equilibrium is unique in the 
following sense: It is the unique limit of subgame perfect equilibria to the 
finite horizon electoral game. 
In the case when candidates can commit for a finite time into the 
future, we show that a stationary minmax path (a path which minimizes the 
maximum vote that can be obtained against it) yields a political business 
cycle. 
1Support for this research was provided, in part by NSF grant #SES-8604348 to the California
Institute of Technology. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that our results could be 
extended to supra majority rules, as in Proposition 2. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the consumption-investment paths generated by a 
competitive political process operating in the temporal environment of a one-sector 
growth model. We are particularly interested in the conditions which lead to 
neoclassical optimal paths, and those which lead to political business cycles in such a 
political-economic system. 
There is a long history of work in the economics literature on the problem of 
economic growth. The problem was originally formulated by Ramsey [1928], was taken 
up again by Solow [1956], and considered from the point of view of optimal economic 
policy by Cass [1965], Koopmans [1965] and others. 
While the problem of economic growth has received a lot of attention, very little 
has been done to incorporate political institutions into such models. One exception is 
the work of Beck [1 978], who studied political behavior in a continuous time, one-sector 
model of economic growth, where voters differ only in their time preferences. Beck 
shows that if the set of feasible plans is limited to consumption paths that a.re optimal 
for at least one voter, then the path that is optimal for the voter with the median 
discount factor is a majority core. 
longer a majority core if all plans 
He conjectures that the median voter path is no 
are feasible. He also argues that the plan for the 
median voter is a "local equilibrium" , in which no majority can agree on an 
instantaneous deviation, assuming that the optimal path for the median voter will be 
followed after that instant. 
When one leaves the setting of growth theory, there is a fair amount of work that 
has attempted to characterize the type of fiscal and monetary policy that would be 
generated by political processes. A recurrent theme in this literature is that if 
politicians are allowed to make economic decisions, they will generate "political business 
cycles" - business cycles coinciding with the term of office of the politicians. 
Nordhaus [1975] first derived such results in a model in which the incumbent office 
holder must choose among different points along a Phillips curve. He also presented 
some empirical evidence supporting the existence of political business cycles m some 
countries.2 Nordhaus's theoretical argument depends crucially on voter myopia. 
Subsequent papers by Rogoff [1990] (see also Rogoff and Sibert [1988]) and Alesina 
[1987] have derived political business cycles without having to assume voter myopia. 
Rogoff and Rogoff and Sibert show that the introduction of asymmetric information 
over the competency of political candidates can generate a political business cycle. In 
this model a business cycle emerges as a signalling equilibrium in which the size of the 
cycle is used, by the candidate, to signal its competency to the voters. Alesina assumes 
that different political parties have different relative preferences over the trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment levels. He then gets political business cycles 
emerging even when voters have rational expectations, due to the fact that the election 
provides a random shock. Both of the above models are partial equilibrium models. 
Rogoff's economy does not have the capability of real growth, while Alesina's political 
parties have exogenously given policy positions. 
In this paper, we study a discrete-time version of Beck's model: we consider a 
one sector growth model in which voters differ only in their time preferences, and in 
which they vote over the optimal plan. We consider the case where all plans, rather 
than just plans that are optimal for one voter, are available. 
We begin, in section 2 ,  by introducing the details of the standard one-sector 
growth model and providing some background on optimal investment-consumption 
paths for those not familiar with this framework. We then formulate the political 
growth model as a game of two-candidate competition over the set of feasible 
consumption-investment paths. The variable which we focus on is the length of time 
2Subsequent empirical evidence for cycles is mixed. McCallum (1978) and Golden-Poterba
(1980) do not find evidence oLbusiness cycles in the U. S. .But other studies· find evidence of cycles in
other countries. Empirical evidence for cycles can be found in Allen, Sulock and Sabo [1986], Cargill
and Hutchinson [1991], Davidson, Fratianni and von Hagen [1990], Findlay [1990] , Kei1[1988], Paldam
[1979] and Soh (1986] .
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for which political candidates can commit themselves. The type of investment-
consumption path generated is critically dependent upon whether or not the candidates 
are able to commit to multi-period investment plans in a credible manner. 
In section 3, we consider what paths are chosen if candidates can credibly 
commit and voters can choose between investment-consumption paths to be followed 
indefinitely into the future. If all voters have different discount factors, we prove 
Beck's conjecture that the median voter path is not a core when plans that are not 
optimal for some voter are available. We actually prove a stronger result - that there 
is no majority rule core if non optimal plans are feasible, and that any neoclassical 
optimal path (a path that could be optimal for a voter with time consistent preferences) 
can be defeated almost unanimously. 
In section 4, we consider what consumption paths are chosen if it is impossible 
for candidates to credibly commit to indefinitely long consumption plans, but can 
instead just commit for one period. We show that there is a "unique" subgame perfect , 
stationary, symmetric equilibrium to the two-candidate competition that supports the 
consumption path that 1s optimal for the voter with median discount rate. The 
equilibrium we identify 1s "unique" in the following sense. It is the limit of unique 
subgame perfect equilibria to the finite horizon electoral game, and any equilibrium to 
the infinitely repeated game that is such a limit must yield the same consumption 
investment path. In essence, we show that Beck's intuition is correct in the discrete 
time setting. 
In section 5, we consider the case where candidates can commit for only a finite 
time into the future. We investigate which paths can be defeated by the smallest 
majorities. We show that a stationary minmax path (a path that can be defeated by 
the smallest majority) exibits a political business cycle. 
We conclude that political business cycles can be explained by models that 
require no myopia or incomplete information, and that the existence and severity of 
political business cycles may be related to the length of the time horizon that the 
political system can commmit .3 Our analysis also raises questions as to whether 
3In connection .with this result, the findings of Paldam (1979)· are quite intriguing. He studies
49 stable governments in 17 OECD countries, finding significant business cycles in four year 
governments, but no significant cycles in three year governments. Thus longer terms in office lead to 
less stable consumption paths. 
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neoclassical optimal paths are socially desirable, since they can always be defeated by 
virtually unanimous majorities. In particular, cyclical paths are majority preferred to 
them and can only be defeated by smaller majorities. 
2. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL
We choose the simplest possible dynamic framework to model the economy: a 
one sector growth model. We also choose the simplest possible political process: two­
candidate competition. The economy is very simple: there is one good which can be 
consumed or invested (for example corn which can be planted or eaten). Decisions on
the consumption-investment stream are made by the political process. 
We first review the basic setup and results of the one sector growth model we 
use: Let F: � --> � be a twice continuously differentiable concave production function4
with F( 0) = 0, F '( 0) = + oo, F '( oo) = 0. Let kt be the per capita capital stock at the
beginning of date t, and ct be the consumption per capita on date t, and let
T E N  U {oo}. The technology can be summarized in the fundamental equation of
growth theory: we are given k > 0, and for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .  ,T,
(2.1) 
where 
(2.2) 
Thus each period, the output of production is divided between consumption and capital 
for use in next period production. Any path c = { ct}o < t < T which is a feasible solution
to (2. 1) and (2.2) is called a feasible consumption path. Let e denote the set of feasible 
consumption paths. 
The one sector growth model has been studied extensively in the case where a 
particular social welfare function is defined. The primary interest has been in solving 
for a feasible consumption investment path which maximizes the welfare function. In 
most cases the welfare function has been assumed to be temporally separable with 
impatience represented by a discount factor, 8. That is, for any c Ee, U( c) = 
L; f = 0otu( ct), where 8 E (0, 1) and u: � +--> � satisfies u'( c) > 0, u'( 0) = oo and u"( c) < 0
4The production function F(k) is frequently assumed to be of the form f(k) = f(k) + (1-.\)k,
where .\ is the depreciation rate of capital stock, and f(k) is the net output. Hence, (1-.\)k is the
undepreciated capital. 
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for all c E IR+. The problem to be solved is:
c1a� I: r = ofi
tu( Ct) (2.3) 
Any solution to the above problem (for some 8) will be called a neoclassical optimal
path. 
Any solution {( cj, k'[)} 0 < t < T can be characterized by a family of policy
functions ht( k; T) and gt( k; T) = F(k) - ht(k; T) for the optimal capital and consumption
at time t, as a function of capital at the previous time period, such that k0 = k, 
kt+l = hi(k'[,T), and cj = gt(k'[,T). For the infinite horizon model, the solution can be
expressed in terms of a single pair of functions h(k) = ht(k; oo) and g(k) = gt(k;oo). 
Further, h satisfies h' > 0 and h(k) < k* for k < k*, and h(k) > k* for k > k*, where k* is
defined by5 
F '(k*) = i (2.4) 
The above results imply that the optimal path of capital begins at k0 and converges
monotonically to k*. Similarly, the optimal path of consumption converges
monotonically to c *  = F(k*)- k*. 
In this pa per, instead of using a social welfare function, we assume that there is a 
set N of n voters. Voters all have the same one period utility for consumption, but
differ in their time preferences. Voter i E N, has a discount factor 0 < D; < 1, and this
voter's utility function U;: e -+ llil over consumption paths is given by6
U;( c) = I:f = 08Ju( ct), (2.5)
where u: llil + -+ IR satisfies u'( c) > 0, u'( 0) = co and u"( c) < 0 for all c E IR+ . We will
assume throughout that any two distinct voters have distinct discount factors: i. e., 
5To see this, let v* be a function satisfying v*(k)=maxc[u(c)+8v*(F(k)-c)]=maxh 
[u(F(k)-h)+8v*(h)]. Then v*(k) = u(F(k)-h(k))+8v*(h(k)), where for all k, h(k) satisfies
8v*/8h=O =? u'(F(k)-h(k))=Dv*'(h(k)). By the Envelope theorem, v*'(k)=8v*/8k= u'(F(k)­
h(k))F '(k). Hence, u'(F(k)-h(k)) = .Sv*'(h(k)) = Du'(F(h(k))-h(h(k)))F '(h(k)) =? u'(g(k)) = 
Du'(g(h(k)))F '(h(k)). Note that if h(k) = k, then Du'(g(k)) = u'(g(k))/F '(k) =? F '(k) = 1/8. The value
function) v* is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. In other words,
v*'(k) > O, and v*"(k) < 0. For more details the reader can consult Harris [1987]. 
60ne might worry .. about the distribution of ct.-across -voters) - but -we will treat this as a public
good. That is, the elected candidate will picl< Ct> the amount of Yt to be consumed, yielding voter i a
utility level of u( ct) for that period. Most of the results we show in this paper extend to the case where
the good is private with one period utility functions being logarithmic (see Boylan [1992]). 
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i � j =} fji � fj j· 
In addition to the voters, we assume there are two candidates. The political 
process consists of a sequence of elections, in each of which the two candidates compete 
for office by offering consumption plans for the duration of their term of office. We 
assume that at period iL, the society is able to choose a policy that commits them for
the next L periods (or T - iL periods if this is less than L). Thus, there are <J elections,
in each of which one of two candidates is elected to serve a term of office of length L 
periods, where 1 S: <J LS: T.
The above represents a general framework for study of the problem of growth 
under two candidate competition. In this paper we will consider some special cases of 
the above model. In the first case, considered in section 3 there is only one election 
with a very long term of office: <J = 1, L = T = oo. In the second case, considered in
section 4, we consider the case when commitment is not possible: <J = T = oo, L = 1.
In the final case, considered in section 5, there is an infinite sequence of elections with 
finite terms of office: <J = T = oo, L > 1. 
These three cases represent extremes m the ability to commit or plan for the 
future. In the first case, the political process makes a decision once and for all as to the 
plan to be followed into the future. The plan of the elected candidate is carried out 
with no possibility for revision later on. In the second case, the political process allows 
only incremental planning, with decisions on current consumption made at that point in 
time, and no ability to commit for the future. The final case corresponds to the 
situation in which there are periodic elections, in which candidates make promises for 
the policy that they will follow during their term of office, and these promises are 
believed by the voters and carried out by the candidates once in office. 
3. INDEFINITE COMMITMENT
Suppose that candidates and voters can commit to carry out multi-period actions 
for significant periods into the future. What will a majority rule equilibrium look like? 
The answer, of course, depends on the types of commitments that are possible and 
credible. In this section, we will make about as extreme an assumption as is possible. 
We assume candidates can commit to feasible consumption paths, for all t, and that
voters and the other candidate believe these commitments. We assume that there is 
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one election, at time r = 0 to determine the consumption path to be followed into the
future. The two candidates offer proposals, and the voters vote for the plan that they 
like the best. We assume that candidates get utility just from winning the election, and 
have no policy preferences. Voters get the utility of the consumption stream offered by 
the winning candidate. 
Formally, we assume that there is a set J{ = {1,2} of two candidates, and that 
the strategy set for candidate i E J{ is Si = C, the set of feasible consumption paths.
Given a pair of strategies adopted by the candidates, we assume that voters vote for the 
candidate proposing the policy they like best (abstaining if indifferent) .  Write 
n(c,c') = I {i E N:U;(c) > U;(c')} I to be the vote of c' against c. Then for any
s = (s1, s2) EC X C, we can define the payoff function M(s) = M 1(s) = - M2(s) for a two 
person zero sum game between the candidates by: 
= { 1 - 10 if n( sv s2) > n( s2, s1)if n(s1, s2) > n(s2, s1)otherwise ( 3.1) 
The above situation corresponds to a standard game of two candidate electoral 
competition under majority rule, where the space from which the candidates choose 
their policies is the set C. We want to identify pure stratgy Nash equilibria to this 
game. 
A point c E C is a majority rule core if there is no other feasible path, c E C such 
that n(c,c') > n/2. Given the assumptions we have made, (c,c) is a Nash equilibrium to 
(3.1) if and only if c is a majority core (See proof to Proposition 1 in the appendix). 
Our main finding in this section (proven in the appendix) is that there will be no pure 
strategy Nash equilibria to the game (3.1) . 
PROPOSITION 1: If all voters have different discount factors, there is no pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium for (3.1) . Equivalently, there is no majority core in C. 
The above result may seem surprising at first glance. One might think (at least we did) 
that when utility functions differ only by one parameter, that the median voter theorem 
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would apply, implying that the optimal path for the voter with the median discount 
factor would be a majority core point. To illustrate that this intuition is wrong, we give 
an example showing how the optimal path for the median voter can be defeated. 
EXAMPLE 1: Assume u(c) = ln(c), F(k) = k1/2. There are three voters with 81 = .5, 
8 2 = .05, and 8 3 = .95. Let c* and k* be the steady state values of consumption and 
capital on the optimal path for the voter with the median discount factor, namely voter 
1. By equation (2.4), k* = .0625, and c* = F(k*)-k* = .1875. For simplicity, we
assume initial capital is at the steady state, k*, so that the optimal path is c* = (c*, c*, 
c*, ... ). Now consider the path c' = (c0,c1,c2,c*,c*,c*, ... ), with c0 = .1914, 
c1 = .17188, and c2 = .20243. It is easily checked that this path is feasible. Further, 
both voters 2 and 3 prefer c' to c*: U2(d) = -1.74 5 + 8�U2(c*) > -1.762 + 
8�U2(c*) = U2(c*), and U3(c') = -4.768 + 8�U3(c*) > -4.775 + 8�U3(c*) = U3(c*). 
The intuition for the example is as follows. The optimal path for the median 
voter is beaten by selecting three successive periods, and then perturbing the path a 
small distance in the direction z =  (8y, -281,1) = (1/4, -1,1). This direction vector is
normal to gradient for the median voter, and since c* is optimal for voter 1, z is also in 
the tangent space of the constraint. Further, z has positive inner product with the 
gradient vectors of all other voters. It follows that a small change in the direction z will 
improve the utility of all voters but voter 1, and be approximately feasible. The 
perturbation must be adjusted slightly to maintain feasibility, (which we do by just 
perturbing c0 and c1, and then setting c2 = F(F(F(k*)-c0)-c1)-k*.) This 
perturbation results in slightly more consumption in the first period, followed by a large 
drop in consumption in the second period, and a large rise in consumption in the last 
period. The consumption drop in the second period is necessary to allow investment in 
order to finance the third period rise in consumption. This proposed change is able to 
attract voters with lower discount factors because of the greater consumption right 
away. But it is simultaneously able to attract voters with higher discount factors 
because of the higher total consumption, which voters with higher discount factors are 
willing to wait for. 
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The above example is worked out for an optimal path of the median voter. 
However, Proposition 1 establishes that any path, optimal or not, can be defeated by 
another path. Hence, the above result does not allow us to make any specific prediction 
about what kinds of paths might be observed. 
Given the results of Proposition 1 the next natural question is to ask is if there 
are any paths that are "more stable" than others. To address this question, we consider 
the size of the majority by which various paths can be defeated, and attempt to identify 
those that can be defeated by the smallest majority. 
PROPOSITION 2: If all voters have different discount factors, then for any 
neoclassical optimal path, c E e, there is an alternative path c' E C,which defeats c by at 
least n - 1 votes. If c is not optimal for any voter i, then it can be defeated by n votes. 
The same results hold if we restrict the set of alternative paths to those that differ from 
c at no more than 3 consecutive periods. 
4. ONE PERIOD COMMITMENT
We showed 
equilibrium exists. 
credible. Because 
that if voters can choose between multi period proposals, no 
However, it can be argued that multiple period proposals are not 
of the temporal nature of the decision, period t decisions must be
implemented before period t + 1 decisions. But once period t decisions are
implemented, there is always the opportunity to revise the period t + 1 decisions. In
making the period t decision, all players would realize this aspect of the problem, and
they would make the period t decision conditional on the belief that the period t + 1 
decision will be made subject to preferences at that point in time. This means that 
multi-period deviations from a proposed "status quo" consumption path can only occur 
if players will want to continue with the deviation even in the later periods of the 
deviation. For example, if a coalition supporting a deviation contains members with 
both high and low discount factors, then for the deviation to benefit both groups, it may 
be necessary that the groups get their benefits at different times. Once the players with 
low discount factors have received their benefits from higher initial levels of 
consumption, they may no longer be willing to support the investment necessary to help 
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their coalition partners with higher discount factors. Of course, if the coalition 
members had realized this problem when they were contemplating the proposed change, 
they would never have formed the coalition in the first place. This realization by the 
individuals that coalition members may want to back out of their agreements later in 
the process will make it harder to find proposals which can beat the status quo. 
In this section we make the other extreme assumption about the possibilities for 
credible commitments and assume that no commitment is possible. We do this by 
requiring behavior to be subgame perfect; that is, an equilibrium strategy must be 
equilibrium behavior at every period. We ask whether there are any feasible 
consumption paths which are political equilibria under the restriction that any proposed 
change must be supported by subgame perfect behavior. We need first to be more 
precise about strategies and equilibrium. 
We first look at the finite horizon model. In the finite horizon model, we show 
that there is a unique equilibrium for any finite horizon, T, namely the optimal path for 
the voter with the median discount factor. We then show that as T goes to infinity, the 
solution to the finite horizon model converges to the stationary solution of the infinite 
horizon model, namely to the optimal path in the infinite horizon model for the voter 
with median discount factor. 
Defining strategies requires quite a bit of notation because we are dealing with a 
repeated game in which as the capital stock changes, so does the strategy space and the 
payoff function for the voters. Further, we make very weak assumptions on what 
information individuals have, so that our model can include various secnarios. For 
instance, some voters may be more informed than others. 
A history includes an initial capital stock, and for each period the proposals of 
each candidate, the vote of each individual, and the outcome of the tie breaking 
procedure. Write Ht = � x (�2 x (KU {O} r x I<)t - l for the set of all histories at time
t. Let kt: Ht -> R be such that if the history at time t is ht E Ht> then the capital
endowment at time t is kt(ht)· Notice that k
0(h0) = h0 = k. Let '.!bi C 2H' be the
information partition which describes the information of individual i at time t. We 
assume that the partition is such that individual i knows kt; first note '.!bi is finer than
'.!bt, where '.Jbt = {(ht)-1(k):k E kt(Ht)}.
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Voter i's strategy at time t is a function o-�: Ht X IH.2 -> K LJ {O} such that for all
candidates' promises ( c1, c2), o-i: Ht x ( c1, c2) -> KU {O} is %i -measurable. If
o-i(h,c) = j, then voter i, given a history of h and promises c, votes for candidate j. If
o-i(h,c) = 0, then voter i abstains. Voter i's strategy is a sequence O"i = (o-i)f =o·
Candidate j's strategy at time t is a %{ -measurable function s}: Hr•IH. such that
for all h E H1, s{(h) E [O,F(kih))]. If s{(h) = ci, then candidate j, given history h, 
promises consumption cJ. All promises must be feasible. Candidate j's strategy is a 
sequence sj = (s{)'{'= 0. Let O" = (o-1, ... , o-n) be a profile of strategies for the voters, and
let s = (s1, s2) be a profile of strategies of the candidates. We write e = (s, o-) for a
( n + 2)-tuple of strategies by the voters and candidates, respectively. For any strategy
n-tuple o-t by the voters, candidate promises c = ( c1, c2) E IH.;_, capital stock k, and
candidate j E K, define
to be the plurality for candidate j at time t. For any time t, history h1, strategy ( n + 2)­
tuple e = ( s, o- ), and x E K, the winning candidate is
otherwise. 
Thus, wt(hb e, x) indicates the winning candidate at time t if the history stock is ht, 
candidates adopt the strategies J, voters adopt the strategies o-i, and ties are broken in
favor of candidate x. Every strategy e, capital stock k, and vector x = (x0, x1, x2, ... , 
xT) E KT determines a sequence of winning candidates, {(wi(ht, e, x)}o < t < T· 
Suppose at time t the history is h E Ht_ 1, the strategy is e, and the tie break is
x. Then, after period t + 1, the history will be
h�+l(h,e,x) = (h�(h,e), Sf+r+l (h�(h,e),e), sr+r+l (h� (h,e),e), 
o-} + 7 + 1 (h�(h, e), e), .. ., o-? + 7 + 1 (h�(h, e), e),x1+7 + 1), 
where h6(h, e, x) = h. Let
(h ) wt(h1,e,x)(h )ct b e,x =St t 
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be the consumption selected by the winning candidate. Let 
. T-t . t V�(h,e,x) = I: 8[u;(c't+7(ht+7(h,e,x), e,x))
T=O 
Thus, Vj(h, e, x) represents the payoff to voter i E N in period t, given strategies e, 
history h, and tie breaking procedure x. 
For each t, xt is a random variable which is 1 with probability -fJ, and 2 with
probability -fJ. Let G( x) denote the joint distribution of x.
Note that 
Also, for any tth period consumption, ct E �+,let
EV�(h,e;ct) = u;(ct) + 8;EV�+ 1((h,ct,ert(h,c),. . .,er?(h,c)),e).
This represents the value, to voter i, of a one period deviation, in which Ct is 
chosen in the period t, and then all players revert to e in periods t + 1, t + 2, .... 
Next, for any time t, capital stock k, strategy n + 2 tuple e, and j E K, define
{ 1 if ili{(ht, s(ht)1 er)> 00 if ili{(ht, s(ht), er)< 0! if ili{( ht, s( ht) I er) = 0.
So p{(ht, e) is the probability that candidate j wins. For any history h, strategy n + 2
tuple e, and x, define 
uti T-tTTt vq(h, e, x) = I: 8j Pj (hr{h, e, x), e)T=O 
to be the expected payoff for candidate j. 
Also, as before, we can define, for any t = 1, . .  ., T, j E K, and d E � +, 
j . · _ 
· 
j -j 1 j j n j j EWt(h, e, d) - 1 +8yEW{((h,c ,s (h),er (h,c ,s (h)),. . .,er (h,c ,s (h))),e,x)
ifili{(h, (d, s-j(k)), er)> 0
1 2  
= 8jEw{( (h, ci, s-
j( h ), u1( h, cj, sj(h )), ... , un(h, cj, sj(h ))), e, x)
if <P{(h, (d, s-j(k)), u) < 0
= ! + 8 jEw{( (h, c
j, s-j (h ), u1(h, cj, sj (h) ), ... , un(h, cj, sj (h)) ), e, x)
if <P{(h, (d, s-l(k)), u) = 0 
This represents the expected payoff to candidate j, if the capital stock were k, and 
candidate j were to unilaterally vary its strategy at time t using d, and then all players
revert to e. 
DEFINITION: A strategy e* = (s*,u*) is a growth equilibrium if, for all t, 
a. For the voters: For all i EN, h E Ht, and c = ( c1, c2) E IR� ,
u j*(h, c) = arg max ETfi(h, e*; cl) if ETfi(h, e*; cl) i= ETfi(h, e*; cJ)lE K 
u i*(h, c) = 0 otherwise 
b .  For the candidates: for all j EK and h E H1 
s{*(h) E arg max EfVi(h, e*; c). cEn;l+ 
Thus, e* is a growth equilibrium if it is a subga.rne perfect equilibrium to the 
finite horizon candidate/voter game with the additional stipulation that voters adopt 
dominant strategies at each stage of the game. 
Let {h1(k, T)}[ ! l be the optimal investment path for an individual with the 
median discount factor 8, when the initial capital level is k and there are T + 1 periods,
and let {gi(k,T)}[= 0 be the corresponding consumption path. I . e.,
Proposition 3, which is proven in the appendix, states that in a growth equilibrium, the 
consumption path is selected according to g. 
PROPOSITION 3: For any T EN, any growth equilibrium satisfies, for all 0 :St :ST 
and k E IR+, 
1 3  
sfeh,T) = sl(h,T) = g0(kt(h),T-t) 
It follows that on the equilibrium path, consumption is given by {gt( k, T) }t = 0. 
Propositions 4 and 5, also proven in the appendix, state that as the time horizon goes to 
infinity, the growth equilibrium selects the optimal path for voter with the median 
discount factor, and such a path is an equilibrium for the infinitely repeated game. 
PROPOSITION 4: {gt(k,T)}f = 1 converges uniquely to the optimal path for the median
voter in the infinite horizon model, {gt(k)}f= 1.
PROPOSITION 5: Let T = oo. Then, ( s, a) is a growth equilibrium, where for all t and
k, sl(h) = sr(h) = g0(k1(h)) and, for any c = (c1,c2) E IR2+
a�(h1c) = arg max EV�(h,e,c8) if EV�(h,e,c1) of EVj(h,e,c2).fi E k 
5. MULTI PERIOD COMMITMENT
We now consider the case in which candidates can commit for some finite 
number L of periods. To deal with this case, there are two problems we have to 
confront. The first involves what voters and candidates will conjecture will happen in 
the future, after the period to which they are commiting. The second is what policies to 
assume that candidates select for the L periods of commitment in the absence of an
equilibrium. 
Regarding the first problem, in order to deal formally with finite length 
commitment one must specify expectations about what will happen after the period to 
which one can commit. The view we take here is that the problem at time jL is 
identical to the problem at time 0. The distribution of discount factors is the same at
both points in time. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the decision rule that is used 
at time jL is the same for all j. Hence, we look for stationary policies, which are 
identical functions of the underlying preferences at each decision point. 
Regarding the second. problem, we already .know from the results of section 3 
that in the infinite horizon case, neoclassical optimal paths can be beaten by large 
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majorities, and that there is no majority core among the set of feasible paths. Since 
these results only depended on perturbations of length 3, it is obvious that the same 
results will be true when candidates can commit for periods of length at least L = 3. So 
what do we assume candidates do in the absence of a majority core? 
In the absence of a majority core, one reasonable assumption is that candidates 
would choose a path that is as "safe" as possible. There are many ways of formulating 
such ideas in the social choice literature. The one we develop here is the idea of an a 
majority set - the set of policies that can be defeated by at most a majority of size a, 
and the related idea of the minmax set - the set of policies that can be defeated by the 
smallest possible majority. For a justification of the minmax set as the outcome of 
models of two candidate competition, see Kramer [1977].
To develop these ideas, we first consider a simplified version of the problem, in 
which we ignore the continuation game, and consider only the L period problem. For 
each iEN, let fi.;=(1,8;,fjy, ... , 8f-1). Also, for any cEC, let v(c)= (u(c0),u(c2), . . .,
u( c L _ 1)). Then the L period utility function of voter i can be written in the form 
V;( c) = .Qi· v( c), which is in the class of intermediate preferences (as defined by
Grandmont [1 978]).
Now for any c* Ee, let Q = QL(c*) = {c Ee: Ct= Ct for t:::: L} be the set of 
feasible paths differing from c* on only the first L periods. For any c, c' E Q define 
n( c, c') = I {i EN: V;( c') > V;( c)}, to be the vote of c' against c, and n( c) = max 
n( c, c') to be the maximum vote in Q against c. Define n* = min n( c). Any c E � lo�
which n( c) = n* is called a minmax path. Given 1/2:Sa�1,Q any c E Q for which 
n( c) :S an is called an a-majority path.
Using results of Kramer [1 977], we can characterize any a-majority path (and 
hence any minmax path) as a path c E Q which is optimal for an imaginary individual 
with discount vector d= (d0,d1, . .. ,dL-l)E".D, where ".li= co{.Q;:iEN}. Further, if
there are enough voters, dis an interior point of ".II. Thus, we can write d = L-? = 1.\.Q;,
where A= ( .\1,. . .  ,.\n) E .6.n is a weighting vector with.\;< 1 for all i.
LEMMA 1. Any interior point. d of ".II.exhibits increasing marginal willingness to trade 
period t - 1 consumption for period t consumption. In other words, defining 
1 5  
It= dtf dt 
_ 1, it follows that It< Is fort< s.
Thus, the general problem of finding an a-majority path can be reformulated as 
that of finding an optimal path for an "imaginary" voter whose willingness to trade next 
period consumption for this period consumption is increasing over time. We therefore 
consider the problem of finding an optimum for such an imaginary voter when the voter 
can recommit every L periods. 
So let 8 = (1,81, 82,. . .  ), be a discount vector where the discount structure may 
not satisfy the usual requirement that 8t = oi. Fort 21, we define It= 8tf8t-I·
Let h= (h1, .. .,hL): IR-+ !RL, represent the L period policy function, where ht(k)
represents the capital at the beginning of period t if k is the initial capital stock at time 
t = 0. For notational convenience, we write h0(k) = k. For any integer j, define 
hjL+ t(k) = ht(h{(k)), and for any h, define
00 
vh(k)= L 8t+ Lu(F(ht(k))- ht+ i(k)).i = O  
Now, for any h:!R-+ !RL, v:!R-+ IR, and k E IR, define
L-1 
w(k; h,v) = L 8tu(F(hi(k))- ht+ i(k))+v(hL(k)).i=O 
We want to find an h such that for all k, 
h(k) E arg m9x w(k; h, vh).h 
(5.1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
If there is a solution to problem (5.3) , then for each initial capital k0 = k, in each 
period of commitment, the imaginary individual will choose to leave for the next 
commitment period the "correct" capital stock, h L(k ). Thus, at this solution, the 
imaginary individual can be considered to be solving the L period problem 
Given .the way we have formulated the problem, the individuals choosing at time 
jL would use the vector 8, and would make the conjecture that a similar vector would 
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be used to make the decision at time (j + 1 )L, etc. In a stationary equilibrium, these 
conjectures would all be consistent and support beliefs that would make it optimal to 
leave the correct capital stock to the next commitment period. 
If his a solution for (5.3), and k is any initial capital stock, and write kt= ht(k). 
We say that {kt}f = 0 exhibits a political business cycle if k0 = kL f kt for some
0 < t < L. 
PROPOSITION 6: If It f Is for some 0 < t,s < L, then there is no solution to (5.3)
that satisfies kt= k for all t. Any solution satisfying k L = k0, must yield a political 
business cycle. 
It follows from Proposition 6 that at least in the limiting case, when steady state 
consumption has been reached, the minmax path exibits a political business cycle. 
Note that while we have used the minmax set to motivate the above argument, 
the same argument would hold for any decision rule that selects an interior point of ".D, 
(for example the mean of the individual discount vectors). We close with an example 
illustrating the solution to (5 . 3) for a special case. 
EXAMPLE 2: In this example, we compute a solution to problem (5.1 )  - (5.3) for the 
case that u(c) = ln(c), and F(k) = k", with a= . 5 .  We compute an example for 100
voters with discount factors uniformly distributed between . 5  and 1. 0. 7 In this example, 
rather than computing the minmax vector, we have computed a solution for the 
average: A;= l/n for all 1 � i � n. 
To compute a solution, we choose a grid on k (capital), and for any given L 
proceed as follows: 
1. Start with an initial guess v(k) of vh(k) on the grid.
2. Compute h(k) E arg m£X w(k; h, v) for each k on the gridh 
3. Set h(k) = h(k) on the grid.
7Experimental data on the distribution of individual discount factors can be found in Lazo
[1992], who also give a review of other empirical and experiinental work on this topic. For our 
purposesi the main finding is that there are significant differences in discount factors across individuals. 
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T 4. Compute v(k) = vh(k) = Lot+ Lu(F(ht(k))- ht+ 1(k))t=O 
5. If I v-v I < T (in the 11 norm) STOP.
6. Else, set v(k) = v(k), and go to 2.
We use as our grid H = {k = .002 x j : j an integer with 0 :<::: j :<::: 200}. We set T = 150, 
and r = 1.0 x 10 - 10. In all the examples we have tried, we find the above program
always converges (reaches STOP). 
The solution to the above program, if it converges, yields (up to computer 
accuracy) a stationary optimal policy function, h(k) = (h1(k),. . .,hL(k)) defined on H. 
Given a stationary optimal policy function, we can generate a growth path from any 
initial capital stock, k0 by using the definition of he(k) for arbitrary e = jL + t with 
1 :<::: t :<::: L and j :'.'. 0. (We do a linear interpolation between hi[hjL(k)j) and
hi(lhjL(k)j+ 1) to compute he(k) for j > 0).
Figure 1 illustrates optimal growth paths for the case when L = 3, 6, and 12, 
respectively, and k0 = .01. In each figure the top line is output (Yt = F(kt)), the center 
line is consumption (ct= F(kt) - kt+ 1), and the bottom line is gross investment 
(it= kt+ 1 - kt)· We note in the example that the political business cycles have the 
feature that output and consumption peak at the beginning and end of the electoral 
term, while investment peaks in the middle of the term. Also we note that the 
amplitude of the cyclical behavior increases as the length of the term increases. 
6. CONCLUSION
The growth literature analyses optimal policies and competitive outcomes from 
the point of view of a representative consumer. In this paper, we investigate how the 
political process aggregates preferences of voters with different time preferences. What 
we find is that except for the case where the length of office is one period, the outcome 
of the political process will be different than the prediction given by the representative 
agent model. In particular, in the case of periodic elections, stationary minmax paths 
will behave like optimal business cycles. Unlike Nordhaus, the political business cycles 
are not caused by voter myopia, but by how the majortity relation aggregates 
preferences, and would be selected even at the beginning of the term of office. Our 
analysis also raises questions as to whether neoclassical optimal paths are socially 
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desirable, smce they can always be defeated by virtually unammous majorities. In 
particular, cyclical paths are majority preferred to them and can only be defeated by 
smaller majorities. 
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APPENDIX A 
I. PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION 3 
Proof of Proposition 1: Since the game (3.1) is zero sum and symmetric, if there is any 
Nash equilibrium, there is a symmetric equilibrium, of the form (c,c). 
and 
We first note that (c,c) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (3.1) if and only c 
is a majority rule core. Clearly if (c,c) is a Nash equilibrium of the game then c is 
a majority rule core. To prove the converse, first note that from the assumptions 
on u, it follows that for all i, U; is strictly quasi concave over C: U;(c') 2 U;(c) =? 
U;(>.c+ (l- >.)c') > U-(c) for all 0<>.<1. Assume that c is a majority rule core, 
but (c,c) is not a Wash equilibrium. Then there is a c' with n(c,c') > n(c', c). 
Taking c" = ( c + c')/2, it follows that n( c, c") > n/2. This contradicts the 
assumption that c is a majority rule core. 
Thus, we need only show that there is no majority core. Proceed by 
contradiction and assume that c* E e, is a majority core. By the assumption that 
all voters have u'( 0) = oo, it follows that any path for which Ct = 0 for some t is 
Pareto dominated. Also, since Ct= F(k1) =;. kt+ 1 = 0 =;. c8 = 0 for all s > t, any 
path with c1 = F(k1) is Pareto dominated. Thus, we can assume without any loss of 
generality that 0 <Ct< F(kt) for all t. We now pick r 2 0, and m > 1, and define 
Q= {cE e: 0< Ct< F(k1) for all t, and ct= cf fort < r, and t2 r+ m},
Q*= {(c0, ... , cm_1): for some c'EQ,c�+t= c1for0::; t::; m- 1}. 
Note Q and Q* are non-empty since c* E Q. Clearly Q � e, so if we can find c E Q 
which ma{ority defeats c*, then we are done. Also, for any c E Q, U;( c) -U;( c*) = 
8i{ I:;"� 0 81[ u( c7 + tl - u( c; + t)]}. So 
U;(c) > U;(c*) ¢? I:;"�J 8l[u(cr+tl-u(c;+tll > 0
Thus, for c* E Q, to determine if U( c) > U;( c*), it is sufficient to define m 
p�r�d _:;tility f�nctio==.
s T): IR'i -; IR by v;(x0, ... , x17\ _ i) =:= I:(m� J �lu(;tl, define x -(x0, ... , x111_1)-(cn ... , cr+ m-l), and then check 1f V, x) > v,(x) for anyx E Q*. Thus, the problem reduces to sliowing that x* is not a majority core in Q*
under the preferences { V;} i E N for some T 2 0 and m > 1. 
Now Q, and hence Q*, is a ( m - 1)-dimensional differe,ntiable manifold m 
which con ta.ins c* as a relative interior point. To see this, we can write 
Q* = {(c0, . .. ,cm_1): 0 < c0 < ki, 0 < c1 < F(k';.-c0), 
0 < c2 < F(F(ki - c0) - c1), ... , 
0 <cm_ 2 < F( ... (F(k� - c0)- c1) ... - cm_ 3), 
F( ... (F(k;-c0)- c1) ... - cm_1)= k;+ m-1}. 
Since F is invertible and F(O) = 0, Q* can be rewritten as Q* = {(c0, ... , c\"_ 1):O<gj(c)Sik; for O:Sj:S':'{-?; gm_1(c)= O}, where gol':fr= c0
, 
g]_(c)= F (c1)+ c2, g4(c)= F (F (c2)+ c1)+c0, ... , gm-�c)= F ( ...(F-1�-1(cm-� -\; cm_3J+ ... + c.1 Jtco
, ar;,;J gm-l(c)= F( ... (: ik;- co)-c1) ... cm-1) kr+ m-I· Letif>. Q -+ IR  be such that if>(c) - (g0(c), ... , 
20 
gJn_1(c)). Since p-1 is C1, q. is C1, and since p-1 is 1-1, q. is 1-1. Further one can 
cneck that d<[>jdc is non singular. Also Q* = q.-1[(0, k;r-1 x {Oll· So q. is a C1 
diffeomorphism of Q* onto (0, k;r-1 x {O}, and (0, k;r-1 <;:; !Rm- is clearly open. 
Thus, Q* is a C1 manifold. 
The intuition is that we can make small independent perturbations of c; 
through c; + m _ 2, and then get back on the original path c* in period r + m by 
selecting c7 c;t- m-l to generate the same capital stock, k; + 'l1 as that associated 
with the path c* at period r + m. Thus, in a neighborhood of x , we can write 
Q* = {xE IR':/. : q(x) = 0}
where q: IR':/.->IR is a differentiable function, invertible at x*. (In fact q = 9m in the 
above construction). Write q* = (q0, .. . '! q� _ 1) = V q(x*) E !R
m
, and vi= (vi0, ...
, vi,m-il= v V;(x*)=(u'(x0), ... , oi- u\x;:,_1)). 
, Now it follows from results of Plott [1967], generalized by McKelvey and 
Schofield [1987], that for x* to be a majority core in Q*, with the preferences 
{ V;} i E N' there must be one voter j E N, with a utility gradient vJ in the space spanned by q*, and for any other voter, k EN - {j}, there is a voter i\k) EN- {j, k}
such that vi, is in the space spanned by v;( k) and q*.
It is sufficient to let m= 3. Then vi= (u'(xE), O;u'(xi), ofu'(x2)) = (wo, Owl, 
ofw2), where w,=u'(x*) for j=0,1,2. Now consider any three voters, i, j, an.'! k, 
witli O; < Oj < Sk, and !et A= [v£] be the 3 X 3 matrix whose rows are the gradient 
vectors v*, vj, and vi,, respectively. Then det A = WoW1w2(0 - oj)( 0 k - oj)( O; -0 k)# 0. It follows that v£, vj, and v'j, are linearly independent. Since any three voters 
have utility gradients that are linearly independent, it follows that the symmetry 
conditions for a core point are not met at x*. Hence x* is not a majority core. D
The above proof can also be extended to the case in which all voters have 
different one-stage utility functions as well as different discount factors: The 
symmetry conditions for a constrained core point tell us that the consumption path 
must be a constrained optimum for at least one voter. But by the results of section 
2, it follows that the consumption path must be a sequence that converges 
monotonically to a point c*. Thus, lim1_. c; = c*. For any r � 0, m = 3, and 
iEN, define vf7:=(u;(c;), O;u;(c;+1), ofu;f<};+2)). Also, define vf=w;(l, o;, of), 
where w; = u';( c*). Select any three voters, z, j, and k, and define A7 = [ v£ ] to be 
the 3 X 3 matrix with rows v*7, vj7, and v'j,7, respectively, and A = [ v£] tcJ' be the 
matrix with rows vf, vj, and vf, respectively. It follows that as r -+ oo, v£ -+ v£ for 
e E { i, j, k}. So A7 -+ A. Since the determinant is a continuous functio; of A, it 
follows that det A7-+ det A = w1w2w3(o;-Oj)(ok-o) (o;-ok) f 0. Hence, for 
large enough r, det A7 # 0. If we p1cK r large enough so that det A7 f 0 for all 
triples of voters, then the symmetry conditions for a constrained majority core are 
not met for the Q* defined by this r. Thus, there is no majority core.8 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let c* E e be a neoclassical optimal path. Thus, there is a O
such that c* is optimal for the objective function !r'= 0otu(ct)· Let N0 = {j EN: 
8It is an open question whether we can find a path that majority defeats c* with T near 0.
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8 j ;;f 8} . By assumption, I N  6 1  :'.': n - 1. Define 9, Q* and V j as in the previous
proof, where T = -1, and m = 3. Write r.* = (c0, ci,c:l). For each voter j E N,
write vj = V'Vj(r.*) = (wo, "
.i
wl, o]w2), where W; = u'(ci), andv = ( w0, 8wv 82w2). Now for any scalar a >  0, define 
z = a( o2[�n - 2o[�i], 1 ) . 
Then for any j E N we have 
Z ·  Vj = aw2[82 - 280j + o]J = aw2(8 - Oj)2.
It follows that z · v = O, and z · vj > O for all j E N6. Let x = r.* + z. Since all Vj are
differentiable, it is clear that for choice of a small enough Vj(x) > Vj(r.*) for all
j E N 6. We henceforth assume that a is chosen so that this is satisfied. 
and 
The consumption path generated by x need not be feasible. To construct a
feasible path, we need to perturb x to get it to satisfy the constraint while
maintaining the strict preferences of all voters in N 0: As in the previous 
proposition, since c* is neoclassical optimal, r.* is relative interior to Q*. So in a
neighborhood of r.* we can write Q* = {xE iR3+: q(x) = O} whereq(x) = x2 + k3 - F(F(F(k0)- x0)- x1) is differentiable. Also, since c* is optimal,
we know that there is a scalar b such that v = bq*, where q* = (1, l/F '(kj),
1/ F '(ki)F '(k:l)) = V'q(r_*) is the vector normal to the constraint, Q*, at r_*. Pick
E > 0 so that Vj( x - E q*) > V/r.*) and V/ x + E q*) > Vj(r.*) for all j E N 0. Set
y1 = z- Eq*, and y2 = z+ Eq*. Then y1 · q* = - Eq* · q* < 0 ,  and y2 . q* = Eq* · q* > O. 
It follows that we can find 1711_> 0 such that q(J;.* + 17y1) < q(J;.*) and
q(J;.* + 17y2) > q(£*) for all 0 < 17 < 17 0. Let 17* be the minimum of 17 0 and 1. But 
then, setting z1 = £* + 17*yJ_ and z2 = £*+ 17*y2, it follows that q(z1) < q(£*),q(z2) > q(£*), and V/ze) > V;(£*) for e E { 1,2}, andj E N  8. By continuity of q,there is a z =  1z1 + (1 - 1)z2 with q(z) = 0. Hence zE Q*. By concavity of the Vj, 
Vj(z) > Vj.(£*) for all j E N0. 
* 
'_Yriting
*
z = (z0,.zv z2 ) , . It follows t�at tlieconsumption path <! = (z0, z1, �' c , c , . . .  , c , . . . ), 1s a feasible consumption path
such that U(<!) > Uy(c*) for all j E N6. Since I N6 I :'.': n - 1, this proves the first 
assertion. If there is no voter with 8 j = 8, then I N  6 1  = n, proving the second 
assertion. The last assertion in the proposition follows since our construction only 
required three consecutive periods of perturbation. D 
B_ PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION 4 
First we need to introduce some additional notation and prove a preliminary 
lemma. Define {h,y(k, T)}[ ;I" l to be a solution to the following problem:
:"'fx { L 8tu[F(kt)-kt + 1J} (6 .1) 
{k,}, = 0 t = 0 
such that 
0 :S: kt + 1 :S: F(kt )  , t = 0, 1, . . .  ,T (6.2) 
k0 = k > o. (6.3) 
Since u'(O) = oo the inequalities do not bind except for kT 1 .  Furthermorethe objective function is strictly concave and thus there is exactty one solution to
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the problem which is given by the following conditions: 
8F'(kt)u'[F(kt) - k1+ 1] = u'[F(k1_1) - k1] for t = 1, 2, . . .  , T,
kr + 1 = o, k0 = k. 
Let v\k) be the value function for the median discount factor 
investment path voter {k1} = {kt(k, T-t)}� ;: 5+ 1  is selected. I. e., 
t T-t t 
(6.4) 
(6.5) 
when the 
v (k) = � 8 u[F(kt)- kt+ 2l· 
By standard argume�t�,
0
vt(k) is strictly concave.
The following lemma gives a monotonicity property of optimal paths in the 
finite horizon setting: 
LEMMA: Let {ki}[ = 1 and {Jii}f = 1 be two optimal growth paths for a voter with
discount factor 8, where k0 > k0. Then, 
F(kt)-kt+ 1 > F(kt) - kt+ 1, for t = 1, . . .  , T.
Proof: Suppose the lemma does not hold. Let T be the swallest positive integer 
for which the inequality does not hold and let {kt}f = 1, {kt}k 1 be two optimal 
growth sequences for which the lemma does not hold. Suppose k1 ::'.': k1. Then 
- k1 ::'.': -k1 => F(k0) - k1 > F(k0) - k1 
=> u'[8(k0)-k1] < u'[8(k0)-k1]. 
The first order conditions then give 
8F'(k1)u'[F(k1)-k2] < 8F'(k1)u'[F(k1)-k2J· 
Thus 
and 
u'[F(k1) - k2] < u'[F(k1)-k2] 
k2 > k2. 
By repeatedly using the first ordersonditions we get that kt > kt for t ""  2, . . .  T + 1. 
But this is not possible since kr + 1 = kr + 1 = 0. Therefore, k1 > k1 and T > 1.
Furthermore let 
It= kt+ 1 
lt = kt+ l , fort= 1, . . . , T-1.
Then {lt}f;; l, {!iJf;; l are two optimal growth sequences for which the lemma does not hold, contradicting the minimality of T. D 
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof is by induction on the time horizon, T. If 
T = 0, then s0(h,T) = F(h0(k,T)) = F(k) = g0(k, O) is clearly the only Nash equilib­
rium for the candidates, since all voters' one period utility functions are monotonic 
in consumption. Further, any undominated strategy for a voter must have the 
property that the voter always votes for the candidate offering the highest level of 
consumption, abstaining only if there is a tie. 
Now we assume the result is true for T - l , and show it is true for T. Thus, 
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suppose that for all t > O, and all k, s�(h,T) = g0(k\h),T-.t) are subgame perfect
response�. Suppose that s0(k, T) f. g0(k, T). If sQ(k, T) > g0(k, T), then
F(k)- s0(h, T) < F(k) - g0(k, T). By the monotonicity of 9 t,  proved in the above
Lemma, and the monotonicity of u, 
u(gi(F(k) - g0(k,T),T- l))- u(gi(F(k)- sb(k,T), T-l)) > 0. 
Note that EV}'(h, e*,c) is strictly concave in c �see Harris (1 987]) Let c* = g(k) be the
(unique) maximum of EVf' in (0, F(k (h))J. Now pick j E K, and pick
cl E [O,F(k1(h))] with cl f. c*. There are two cases.
If cl > c*, then, using the monotonicity of 9 t (k, T- l) in k for all t 2': 1, and
the monotpnicity of u(c) in c, we get cl > c*=? F(k)- cl< F(k)- c* =? 
gt(F(k)- cJ, T- l) <gt(F(k) -:- c*,T- l) for all t 2': 1=? 
U\9t (F(k)- c*, T- l)) - u(g t(F(k)- cl, T - l)) > O  for all t 2': 1. But then, if
ti; 2': Om, we have 
EVi (h e*· c*) - EVi (h e*· cj)0 ' ' 0 ' ) 
= u( c*) - u( c) + ti; I: ttiJ[ u(gi(F(k) - c*, T - l )) - u(g t (F(k) - ci, T - l)J] 
2': u(c*)- u(c) + timI: toU u(gt(F(k)- c*,T- 1))- u(gt(F(k)- cj,T- 1))]
= EV;)(h, e*; c*) - EV;)(h, e*; cl) > 0. 
Hence, EVh(h, e*; c*) > EVb(h, e*; cj) for all i with ti; 2': ti'A. If cj < c*, a similar argu­ment establishes that EVb(h, e*; c*) > EVb(h, e*; c ) for all i with ti; ::; Om· It
follows that in both cases, we have 
iJ?b(h, (c*, s-i*(h)), u*) = <J?b(h, (c*, c*), u*) = 0
> I {i EN: EVb(h,e*; cj) > EVb(h,e*; c*)} I
- I { i EN: EVb(h, e*; c*) > EVb(h, e*; cj)} I 
I {i E N: ub(h, (d, c*)) = j} I - I {i E N: ub(h, (d, c*)) E k- {j}} I 
= <J?b(h, ( d, c*), u*) = iJ?b(h, ( d, s-i*(h)), u*).
Hence iJ?j(h, ( d, s-i*(h))), u*) is maximized at cj = c*. This proves the result. D
Proof of Proposition 4: Fix k, a�d let ti be the disco;mt factor of t.he median voter.For T E 7l. U {oo}, let pT <;;; [O,c] be the set of feasible consumpt10n paths for the
T period model, when the initial cqpital stock is k. For c E FT, write VT(c) 
= I: f = 18 1u( c t)· For T E 7!., define C t = 9 t( k, T) and ci = 91(k ) . So
cT = arg max VT(c), 
and cEFT 
c* = arg max V00(c). 
cEF00 
By the assumptions on u, and ti, it follows that for all T E 7l. U {oo}, vT(cT) < oo.
Define c T E poo by 
� T t -
{ cT if t<T
c t  = 0 if t > T.
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Note that F00 is compact with t,\;e product topology. Thus 1Ji.ere exists a sequence
{T;};, and a c E F00 such that c i ... c .  Let E > 0. Choose T such that 
�-otu(c) < �-
t = T Choose I such that i > I implies
Then 
I VTi(C Ti) - VTi(c ) I < � and T; > T. 
V00 (c ) ::; V00( c*) ::; VTi(c T;) + � ::; VTi(c ) + E ::; V00(c ) + E 
=? V00(c ) = V00(c*) =? c E arg max V00(c). 
Finally, uniqueness follows because tlf�Fs�t of optimal paths for the infinite horizon
model is convex, and any strict convex combination is strictly better. D 
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose (s, o-) is not a growth equilibrium. There are two
possible cases: 
(i) Suppose there exists sj' and h E Ht such that
EWj(h, e-j, sj') > EWj(h, e-j, sj).Then there exists T > 0 such that 
E[ f: o}p}(hi(h, e'), e')] > E[ f: S}p}(hi(h, e), e)],
where e' = ti'�sj') . We know thatt �\1 an equilibrium to the game with horizon t + T.
Thus T T E[I:; o}p}(hi(h, e'), e')] ::; E[I:; o}p}(hi(h, e), e)], 
a contradicifoJ. t = 1 
(ii) Suppose that there is a o-i' and h E Ht such that
EV;(h, e-i, o-i') > EV;(h, e). 
The same type of argument yields a contradiction. 
C. PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION 5
D 
Proof of Lemma 1: Use the fact that x- 1 is a strictly convex function of x. Then
using Jensen's inequality, 
l.. = . [ .\;o; ]co ·) - 1 > ( . [ \ol J . " ·) - 1 = _1_ o It L ' ), . .\ .0t. ' L z L . .\ .5t. z It + f� ;  J J J J J 
Proof of Proposition 6: Assume that h is a solution for (5.3). Let k E IR be any
initial capital stock, and write kt = ht(k). Then the k/s will satisfy the first order
conditions: 
u'(F(kt 
_ 1) - kt)= ltF'(kt)u'(F(k1)- kt+ 1), for 0 < t < L
8L-1u'(F(kL - 1)-kL) = v/,(kL) 
25 
where It =  8tf 81_1. It follows immediately that there is a solution for the first L 
equations that satisfies kt= k for all t only if 1 = 1rF'(k) for all 0 < t < L whichoccurs only if all the it 's are equal. Therefore, if /t =f' /s for some t ,s ,  then for anyk satisfying k0 = kL = k, there must be a j for which kj fo k. But this is a political
business cycle. 0 
Computations for Example 2: The problem to be solved is: 
such that 
{k�} �r� �o1u(F(k1J- kt+ il,
0 ::;  kt+ 1 ::; F(k1), for 0 ::;  t < T
k0, kT > 0 given.
Write it = otf 81_1 for 1 ::;  t < T. Then the solution satisfies the first order
conditions 
11F'(kt)u'(F(kt)- kt+ 1) = u'(F(kt _ 1)- k1), 1 ::;  t < T
kr, k0 > 0 given.
We consider the special case of F(k) = kOi, and u(c) = ln(c). In this case, the first line
reduces to 
CX/tk? -
1
- 1k? - kt+ I kr _I - kt 
Writing 'flt = CX/t, and Zt = ktf k? _ 1 for 1 ::; t < T, we can rearange terms and rewrite
the above as 
z - 'flt t 1 + 'flt - Zt + I
We can solve for the z1 as follows. Define d1 recursively for 1 ::; t < T by
dr =  1 
dt = 'f/tdt + 1 + (1 - ZT)
So d1 = at- btzT, where a1= l + �;�j  [Tif=t 'f/;], and b1= l + �;�;  [l l i= t  'f/;]. Then, for all t, 
z1= (dt- (l- zr))jd1 
To see this, clearly since dT = 1, the result is true for t = T.for t. Then for 1 ::; t ::;  T, 
'flt - 1 'flt-ldt Zt -1 = 1 + 'flt - 1  - ( dt - (1 - zr))f dt = 'flt -1 dt + (1 - ZT)It follows that 
(at- l)- (bt - l)zTZt = b at- tZT
Suppose the result is true 
dt-1- (l - zr) 
dt-1 
In the example, ky = 0. So zy = 0. To find the kh we first solve for the zt, and
then solve for the kt the given k0 and
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We must show that for j E K, 
si*(k) E arg max EW/k, e*; d). (5.3) 
c3 E U\l+ 
But since candidates 1 and 2 use the same strategy, s1* = s2*, then for all k, we have
EWj( k, e*) = 2( 1 � 8 )  - dj > 0.
That is,. EW/k, e*) is independent of k. Thus, EW/F(k0) - d, e*) = E�(F(k0) -
s-1*(k), e*) = dj" So we can rewrite . . . { 1 + 8jdj if <I> .ik, �d., s -J*�k}), ,,.*� > 0E�(k, e*; d) = fjdj . . �f <t>; k, d, s:::: �= k l' a: < 0 
2 + 8Jd} 1£ <Pj k, d, s k ) ,,. = 0. 
We can rewrite (5.3) as 
sj*(k) E arg .max sgn {<t> (k, ( d, s -j*(k)), a*J}, (5.4) 
c3 E U\l J + 
where sgn( x) . is the sign of x. {Therefore, in equilibr�um, at any capital stock k, j will
choose d to maximize sgn <t>/k, (d, s-J*(k)), a*)j and will ignore the future. 
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